Introduction
The present exercise in typological semantics is framed within the theory and methodology of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach to linguistics, originated by Anna Wierzbicka (1972 Wierzbicka ( , 1992a Wierzbicka ( , 1996 Goddard and Wierzbicka 1994, 2002; cf. Goddard 1998a) . This is a comprehensive approach to cross-linguistic semantics, based on a long and incremental research program, which uses reductive paraphrase in ordinary language as its method of semantic representation. The general outlines of the NSM theory are well-known (but see Goddard 1998b for a review of popular misconceptions), so I will present only the bare bones here:
i. The foundational assumption is that every natural language is adequate as its own semantic metalanguage ("metasemantic adequacy"). ii. From this, it follows that every language has a non-arbitrary and irreducible semantic core, with a language-like structure: a mini-lexicon of semantic primes (lexical units with indefinable meanings) and their associated mini-grammar. iii. It is furthermore assumed, and a growing body of hard cross-linguistic research supports this assumption, that there is substantial universality in both the lexicon and the grammar of semantic metalanguages.
Aside from providing a suitable theoretical framework, the NSM program has produced a great many fine-grained cross-linguistic studies with a direct bearing on this topic 1 . Many scholars accept as a matter of simple logic, that a typological inquiry requires some kind of notional or semantic framework of comparison, some tertium comparationis, but few yet accept that the semantic foundations of typology must submit to the same principles as semantics generally. In particular, it must avoid the pitfalls of obscurity and circularity, and of terminological ethnocentrism. It would be obscure and circular, for example, to attempt to "define" the concept of "thinking" by reference to expressions such as mental (or cognitive) processes, because terms like mental and cognitive are not any clearer than thinking in the first place. Nor does substituting these Latinate terms in place of the humble think lead to any improvement in accuracy. Quite the contrary, in fact, because there are other kinds of mental or cognitive processes aside from thinking -such as wanting, knowing, and feeling, for example.
It will also be obvious to anyone with a knowledge of other languages that abstract terms like 'mental' and 'cognitive' are highly English-specific. Hence, using them to characterise meanings in other languages is to engage in terminological ethnocentrism, i.e. to impose culturally alien categories as an interpretive grid on other linguistic and conceptual systems. The same thing occurs when English-specific verbs such as believe, judge, or consider, or English-specific ethnopsychological categories, such as "mind", are used to gloss the meanings of words from languages which lack anything corresponding to the English concepts. Terminological ethnocentrism necessarily introduces distortion and inaccuracy because it imposes the perspective of a cultural and linguistic outsider.
Consider two other cross-linguistic projects which have for a long time been based on complex, culture-specific categories, namely, research into 'emotions' and into 'colours'. Some of the leading researchers in cultural psychology and cognitive anthropology (Shweder 2002; D'Andrade 2001) now reject both the meta-category of 'emotion' and more specific terms such as sadness, anger, fear, and surprise. Much better results come from a more finely grained and culture-independent set of analytical categories, anchored in lexical universals such as FEEL, WANT, KNOW, THINK, GOOD, and BAD (cf. Wierzbicka 1999, Harkins and Wierzbicka 2001) . Similarly, some cognitive psychologists now argue that taking 'colour' for granted as an analytical meta-category amounts to taking "a view of the world's languages through the lens of our own category, namely, a systematic sorting of each language's vocabulary by reference to how, and how well, it matches our own" (Lucy 1997: 331) .
On the other hand, if the common reference point is a universal like 'want', for example, cross-linguistic comparison can be conducted in a productive and clear fashion, as Jean Harkins (1995) has shown in her typological-semantic study of 'want' and desiderative constructions. So, our first priority in the present study must be to assess the cross-linguistic viability of the concept 'think' itself. Is it like 'colour' or 'emotion' (a complex and culturespecific category), or is it like 'want' (a simple and universal category)? In this respect, we are fortunate that a substantial body of cross-linguistic research already exists on this subject.
Empirical universals of 'thinking'
Research on a wide range of languages indicates that THINK is a universal semantic prime, i.e. an indefinable meaning which exists as the meaning of a lexical unit in all languages (Goddard and Wierzbicka 1994, 2002; Goddard 2001a) . Other related semantic primes include KNOW, FEEL, SEE, HEAR, WANT, DO, SAY, TRUE and others. Exponents of semantic primes need not be morphologically simple, because morphological complexity and semantic complexity do not always coincide. For example, the English word someone is an exponent of a semantic prime, even though it consists formally of two morphological units (but crucially, in meaning someone ≠ some + one). It is not unexpected, therefore, that in some languages the exponent of THINK is formally complex, as in Mangaaba-Mbula (PNG), where it is a composite form -kam=ŋgar (where -kam by itself expresses DO). Other examples include the Australian language Kayardild, where marral-marutha THINK is a compound 'ear-put' (Evans 1994) , and Kalam (PNG), where the expression gos nŋ-includes nŋ-, which by itself means KNOW (Pawley 1994) . In general, however, NSM findings support Fortescue's (2001) conclusion that exponents of THINK are typically monolexemic and semantically opaque. Of course polysemy is a linguistic fact of life, and frequently occurring items are more likely than most to be polysemous. It should therefore come as no surprise that exponents of THINK often have language-specific polysemic extensions, as will be canvassed in section 3. This means that when we identify exponents of semantic primes in a particular language, we are really dealing with lexical units rather than with lexemes; 2 for example, in saying that English feel is an exponent of a semantic prime, what we mean is that one specifiable sense of the lexeme feel is a semantic prime. As discussed in later sections, the frequency and normal range of use of exponents of semantic primes do not correspond across languages, due to the availability of language-specific near-synonyms and grammatical encodings, and the influence of culturally-driven discourse preferences.
Every semantic prime has a certain "conceptual syntax", i.e. certain specifiable syntactic possibilities (combinatorics, valency and complementation options) as a consequence of its meaning. On present evidence, it appears that the array of frames displayed in (1) below are universally available to the prime THINK. In simple clauses, one may simply 'think about Y', as in (1a). In a more elaborate frame in which the verb also takes an indefinite substantive, i.e. SOMETHING, as a complement, one may 'think something about Y', as in (1b). One can also 'think like this ', as in (1c) . THINK can also take a propositional complement, as in (1d), though this construction is subject to certain restrictions (see below). This way of looking at THINK differs interestingly from Vendler's (1967:110-111 ) influential proposal that THINK has "two basic senses", one of which is a dynamic time-bound process ('thinking about' -"cogitation") and the other a timeless state ('thinking that' -"opinion"). For one thing, Vendler's dichotomy does not correspond to the facts of English in various ways (Wierzbicka 1998: 300-304) . The 'think about' frame, for example, is not always process-like, at least in its elaborated version as in (1b); cf. 'I know they think something bad about me'. More importantly, the 'think that' frame is not always state-like and indeterminate in temporal location but on the contrary is perfectly compatible with "occurrent" thoughts, as one can see from sentences like 'I think that someone is knocking at the door' or 'for the first time I thought that we had a chance'. 4 In fact, it would appear from a cross-linguistic point of view that the "opinion-giving" function of English 'think that' is unusual and language-specific. In Swedish, for example, tänka THINK cannot normally be used with an att-complement, i.e. a that-complement, to state an opinion but it can take an attcomplement to depict an occurent thought, as in (2) , and in certain other contexts (for further discussion, see section 4.1).
(2)
När jag hörde det, tänkte jag att vi kanske hade en chans. when I heard that, thought I that we maybe had a chance 'When I heard that, I thought maybe we had a chance.' Although THINK has a firm claim to the status of a basic and universal linguistic concept, it remains true that languages and cultures vary enormously in the way in which they elaborate this notion, in the significance it is accorded in daily life, in its grammaticalisation, how it figures in discourse, and so on. Just as the existence of basic notions of time, for example, hardly overshadows the huge differences between linguistic and cultural elaborations of basic temporal concepts, so it is with notions of thinking. In both domains the huge variability greatly overshadows the tiny core of universality. To adapt a phrase of Richard Shweder's (1993:517) , the situation is one of "universals without uniformity". The remainder of this paper seeks to provide a broad overview of cross-linguistic variability in ways of talking about thinking. For expository purposes, I have identified six dimensions of variability but no claim is made that this is an exhaustive or water-tight typology. The general trajectory is from examination of lexical phenomena, then on to grammatical phenomena, and finally to the culture and discourse levels. In order to cover more ground, the discussion is abbreviated at many points.
Lexical polysemy of 'think' verbs

Non-compositional polysemy (motivated homonymy)
One of the most intriguing lexical phenomena concerning exponents of the semantic prime THINK is referred to in the NSM literature as "non-compositional polysemy" to distinguish it from standard polysemy (based on shared meaning components). It can also be viewed as motivated homonymy. Both descriptions refer to a situation in which a lexical form which expresses a semantically primitive meaning, in this case THINK, can also express another primitive meaning, such as HEAR, SEE, SAY, or WANT. Since these other meanings are themselves semantically primitive, i.e. indivisible, there can be no common element shared between them and THINK. Since a pair of meanings such as THINK and HEAR, for example, do not share any common component, when a lexical element can express both meanings it would be valid to describe it as homonymy. For example, it would be valid to say that Yankunytjatjara (see below) has two words: kulini 1 THINK and kulini 2 HEAR. But on the other hand, the roster of possible prime meanings which can share an exponent with THINK is obviously not arbitrary, and the term "homonymy" normally suggests an accidental or arbitrary coincidence of formal realisation. In NSM terminology we speak of pairs of meanings such as THINK and SEE, THINK and HEAR, THINK and SAY, as having noncompositional affiliations, and employ the term "non-compositional polysemy" to designate the linguistic relationship. The nature of non-compositional affiliation is itself a fascinating research topic.
Documented patterns of non-compositional polysemy concerning THINK include: THINK with SEE, THINK with HEAR, THINK with both SEE and HEAR (Sweetser 1990, Evans and Wilkins 2000) . Another set of correlations is THINK with SAY, e.g. Ahtna -nii 'say, think, consider'; Xhosa uku-thi 'say, think, call' (Fortescue 2001) . Other more complex patterns are attested as well. In all cases which have been examined carefully there is language-internal evidence for a polysemy analysis. As examples we can consider thumbnail sketches from two Australian languages, Yankunytjatjara and Bunuba.
Yankunytjatjara, Central Australia (Goddard 1991; cf. Evans and Wilkins 2000: 563-5) , has THINK-HEAR polysemy, but the two senses are easily distinguished on language-internal grounds, since each has a distinctive syntactic frame from which the others are excluded.
Only the THINK sense can take a quasi-quotational clausal complement (often introduced by alatji 'like this'), as in (3) . Only the 'hear, listen' sense can take a non-finite circumstantial complement, as in (4) . There is also an additional sense, roughly 'heed', distinguished by its capacity to take a locative case complement, as in (5 Bunuba, North-west Australia, exhibits "hyperpolysemy" in its verb root ma (Knight forthcoming), which in certain contexts, as in (6), is up to five-ways ambiguous. Here I will concentrate mainly on the THINK-SAY polysemy. First of all, Knight observes that "speakers of Bunuba have no difficulty in discerning one meaning from another". Then she establishes that each of these meanings (and each of the other distinct meanings not covered here) has certain distinctive morphosyntactic properties. For example, when an extra argument is added to ma using the OBLique cross-referencing strategy, this new argument assumes the role either of addressee or locutionary topic, i.e. in this context ma can only mean SAY, never THINK (see note 2). Furthermore, if necessary the meaning contrast between THINK and SAY can be expressed unambiguously by means of formally complex expressions, which combine ma with nominal forms for 'head' and for 'mouth', respectively: ma gun.gulu 'think' vs. ma thangani 'say'. This makes it possible to contrast saying and thinking, as in (7). Sometimes cultural factors may help explain particular instances of non-compositional polysemy, as a factor in establishing pathways of semantic change. In world-wide terms, for example, HEAR-THINK and HEAR-KNOW polysemy is not particularly common, but in Australia it is extremely common, an areal feature. In their landmark study documenting this phenomenon, Evans and Wilkins (2000: 580-585) identify "six cultural factors [which are] likely to generate the sort of communicative context in which a verb for 'hear/listen' would, by pragmatic inference, gain a more abstract cognitive reading such as 'think', 'know' or 'remember'". These factors include the role of hearing as the prototype of inwardly directed attention in the permanently public space of Aboriginal social life, Aboriginal ways of "knowing the country" by remembering song cycles, and the primacy of hearing in the Aboriginal socialisation process.
Occasionally one encounters non-compositional polysemy whose rationale is functional, in a grammatical sense. This is the case for Longgu, Solomon Islands, where una, the exponent of THINK, is formally identical to the word meaning 'like this, thusly' (Hill 1994: 315) . The link is presumably that LIKE THIS can be used to introduce a quasi-quotational complement of THINK, i.e. in the frame 'X thought like this: --'. Compare the use of English 'like' in "teen talk" as an introducer of speech and thought complements (Romaine and Lange 1991) . This grammatical frame is, of course, shared with SAY, which constitutes a non-compositional link between SAY and THINK.
Compositional polysemy
Sharply distinct from non-compositional polysemy (in principle, though not always at first blush) is ordinary compositional polysemy, i.e. a situation in which a single lexeme expresses not only the semantic prime THINK, but also one or more other related meanings which contain THINK as part of their meaning.
A rather common situation among the languages of my sample is that a given language has a single, synchronically opaque basic word for general mental activity, like English think.... Such words display various kinds of polysemy, often linked to different patterns of syntactic behavior (Fortescue 2001: 30) One common type of polysemic extension is for the THINK verb also to have a sense involving thinking about someone or something, and feeling something bad because of it. For example: in Mandarin Chinese: xiǎng jia@ 'think, miss family' (Chappell 2002) ; in Yupik Eskimo: cum´r(t´)-'think, worry'; Samoan: mantu 'think, feel lonely' (Fortescue 2001: 29) ; in Japanese omou 'think, pine for' (Onishi 1997: 221) . Another common extension is to 'count' or 'calculate', as with Ewe bu- (Ameka 1994: 63) , Lao khit 1 (Enfield 2002: 169) , or Amharic assәbә´ (Amberber this volume).
The THINK verb commonly extends to a meaning akin to English 'intend' or 'would like to', i.e. a combination of THINK 
things differently).
A similar situation, but more highly elaborated, is found in Chinese (Yu, this volume). In French entendre can mean both 'hear' or 'understand'. Words for FEEL also commonly have polysemic extensions involving THINK, as with the English 'feel that' construction. For example, Malay Aku rasa lebih baik kita pergi [I feel more good we go] 'I feel it's best that we go'. Schematically: (9) I feel that --= I feel something because of this I think that --
Lexical elaboration
Doubtless all languages have a miscellany of language-specific expressions whose meanings involve THINK. For example, in English there are verbs like forget, decide, understand, solve, and many others; adjectives like right, wrong, smart, stupid, confused, and careful; and nouns like mistake, idea, attention, sense, and reason. The following is an attempt to identify and discuss some categories which vary cross-linguistically in interesting ways, constituting a second dimension of variation in ways of talking about thinking.
Language-specific epistemic verbs
Many languages have language-specific specialised verbs of thinking (including many socalled "epistemic verbs"), whose meanings also involve KNOW and/or TRUE, usually in combination with other elements. Some examples from European languages are given in (10). Since such verbs are semantically complex, it cannot be assumed that any of them will match up precisely in meaning across languages. As an example of semantic analysis of an epistemic verb of English, one can take the verb believe, which plays an enormous role in English-language philosophy and "rational" Anglo discourse generally. Wierzbicka (to appear, ch. 5) contains a substantial treatment of this verb, especially in the epistemic phrase I believe (without complementiser that); e.g. in sentences like I believe you can get custard in a tin. Wierzbicka argues that I believe is a quasi-performative "epistemic qualifier" restricted to the first person present tense (like the uses of I think, without complementiser that, discussed in Section 8 below). Roughly speaking, it expresses something like a considered but cautiously expressed personal opinion. The phrase has a "parenthetical" syntax, in the sense that it can occur mid-clause or clausefinally, e.g. You can, I believe, get custard in a tin, and You can get custard in a tin, I believe.
The expression to believe that 6 , on the other hand, is "stronger": it conveys something like conviction or commitment, a certain gravitas. Though it can occur with a first person subject, it is not restricted to first person or to the present tense; cf. sentences like He believed that they shouldn't get the vote or They believed that Phar Lap had been poisoned by a rival stable. Unlike epistemic qualifier I believe, the expression to believe that corresponds to the noun belief. Likewise, only to believe that can collocate with adverbs like strongly; compare, e.g. He strongly believed that they shouldn't get the vote with ?I strongly believe you can get custard in a tin. Wierzbicka (to appear) discusses a range of other evidence and examples in context, which for reasons of space cannot be reviewed here 7 , but all of it appears consistent with explication (11) below.
The initial component articulates the obvious link between X believes that and X thinks that. The subsequent set of components, introduced by 'X thinks about it like this', characterise the nature of the "propositional attitude" involved in believing -that is to say, they characterise HOW X thinks about WHAT he or she thinks. This is a composite of three factors: an awareness that other people may think differently, the sense that one can articulate a reason for thinking as one does, and, furthermore, that one can justify or defend the value of thinking as one does. The last two factors are intended to account for the conviction and commitment conveyed by to believe that (and by the corresponding noun belief), and for the implication that something important is at stake.
(11) X believes that [ --] = when X thinks about it, X thinks that [ --] X thinks about it like this: I know that someone else can think not like this I can say why I think like this I can say why it is good if someone thinks like this
When a language has one or more common epistemic verbs (in addition to THINK), the existence of these verbs will skew the distribution and contextual interpretations of instances of the basic THINK verb. This effect is found in German and French, where glauben and croire usurp part of the potential range of denken and penser, respectively. The effect is even greater in Swedish, which like other Scandinavian languages has several common epistemic verbs, most notably tro (att) "believe (that)" and tycka (att) "feel (that), personally be of the view (that)". The glosses are enclosed in scare quotes here because it is important not to assume that these verbs coincide perfectly with anything in English. It would seem that tro is more evidentary in orientation than English believe and lacks the undertone of personal conviction of the English verb. Aijmer (1997: 15) , for example, states that what is important for tro is that the speaker has reliable evidence that what is asserted in the proposition is true. An example follows in (12). Explication (13), which is given in both English and Swedish, unpacks the meaning of tro and enables it to be readily compared with that of English believe. (This explication was developed in collaboration with Susanna Karlsson.) (12) Jag tror att hon är på stranden. I believe that she is at beach:DEF 'I believe that she is at the beach.' (13) Jag tror att Y = I think now that Y I don't say I know it I think like this because I know something I know that someone else can think not like this nu tänker jag att Y jag säger inte att jag vet det jag tänker såhär på grund av att jag vet någonting jag vet att någon annan kan tänka på ett annat sätt Explication (13) is also consistent with the fact that it is tänka THINK -and not tro -which is used when a speaker is reporting a view about a factual matter which is not based on evidence, as in the textual example given in (14). When tänka THINK takes a propositional complement it also commonly occurs with the reflexive particle sig (or a variant), apparently indicating that the thought being articulated is more or less spontaneous and personal. In addition to tänka THINK and tro "believe", Swedish also has the common epistemic verb tycka. This presents a matter of subjective evaluation based on feeling and/or personal experience, frequently with an ethical or aesthetic dimension. Aijmer (1997: 14-15) compares it with English 'find'. For example: Han tycker att hon är söt/trevlig 'He finds her pretty/nice' or 'He feels that she is pretty/nice.' Swapping tro for tycka would imply that the speaker is relying on reliable hearsay information, rather than reporting his or her own subjective evaluation.
Regardless of the precise semantics of tro and tycka, their existence has important implications for the normal range of use of tänka THINK, and equally for the pragmatic implications of the use of tänka att 'think that' with a propositional complement. Using tänka strongly implies the lack of factual evidence (otherwise one would use tro) and the absence of subjective evaluation (otherwise one would use tycka). In discourse-pragmatic terms then, English think and Swedish tänka are certainly not equivalent, nowithstanding their semantic equivalence. 
Lexical composites of THINK, FEEL and WANT
It appears that all languages have a greater or lesser number of words in which components of thinking, feeling, and wanting are intertwined in complex cognitive scenarios (attitudes, emotions, moods). As it happens, words of this kind have been a long-term focus of NSM researchers, with hundreds of proposed explications available in dozens of studies (see especially Wierzbicka 1999; Harkins and Wierzbicka 2001; Enfield and Wierzbicka 2002) .
At least four semantic configurations appear to be widely attested: (i) thinking about what can happen and feeling something because of it (propositional attitudes), e.g. hope, expect, look forward to, dread, (ii) thinking about something for some time, so as to sustain a feeling ("active" emotions), e.g. worry, rejoice, grieve, fret, (iii) thinking good or bad things about someone and feeling something because of it (interpersonal attitudes), e.g. love, admire, respect, hate, despise, (iv) feelings associated with thinking (emotions), e.g. happy, jealous, surprised, disgusted. Examples (15)-(18) illustrate the kind of formats which NSM researchers have found useful in dealing with words of these four types. (18) X feels pleased = X feels something because X thinks something sometimes a person thinks like this: something good happened I wanted this because of this, this person feels something good X feels like this because X thinks something like this Finally in this section on lexical elaboration, we can look outside the verbal realm into the domain of adverbs, discourse particles and interjections.
Language-specific "epistemic qualifiers": adverbs, particles, and interjections
One can perhaps use "epistemic qualifiers" as a cover-term for various linguistic devicesincluding adverbs, adverbial phrases, and particles -for qualifying one's statements, for hedging one's assertions, and for differentiating the strength of one's assent to a proposition. "Speaker-oriented" epistemic adverbs (Cinque 1999: 86) can be illustrated from English, which has them in large number (presumably serving the same communicative priority as the large number of English epistemic verbs); for example : probably, possibly, conceivably, apparently, presumably, supposedly, reportedly, allegedly, arguably. THINK-related meanings can also be expressed as discourse particles and conversational formulas, though compared with adverbs these tend to be more "interactional" in meaning, in the sense of referring to the addressee's speech or reactions. Obvious English examples would be conversational formulas like That's right!, and Good thinking! (Wierzbicka 2002a ), but on close examination other discourse particles may also disclose "cognitive" meaning components too. For example, it can be argued that English wow, and even well, contain "mental state" components such as 'I didn't think this would happen' or 'I want to think about this well' (Wierzbicka 1992b; Goddard 1998a:176; Schourup 2001) .
As for interjections, Ameka (1992) identifies "cognitive interjections" as one of three broad semantic categories, and suggests that they share a semantic component 'I think something now' and/or 'I know something now', e.g. English Ah-ha!, Oh-oh! Gee! Wow! Mhm. Ameka's other categories -volitive and emotive -are based on I WANT and I FEEL, respectively.
Different ethnotheories of the person, and associated phraseology
A third dimension of cross-linguistic variation in ways of talking about thinking (and thinking about thinking) concerns different ethnotheories of the person. In all languages the existence of the semantic prime BODY "invites" people to theorise about the "other parts" of a person, i.e. about the non-bodily aspects of the person (cf. Wierzbicka 1992a , Matisoff 1986 , Enfield and Wierzbicka 2002 , and the semantics of these concepts (sometimes called 'psychocollocations' or 'PSI-words') often involve THINK, as well as FEEL, KNOW and other elements. Some examples are given in Table 2 . Often the words used for these non-physical aspects of a person are recruited from the bodily domain, as in the right-hand column of Table 2 , but this is often best analysed as polysemy. Russian duša, variously rendered in English as 'soul', 'heart' and 'spirit', is a much broader concept. It is one of the leitmotifs of Russian literature and of everyday Russian conversation. Whereas mind is linked with rational functions, duša is linked, above all, with feelings, and especially those with a certain profundity or spiritual quality: the duša endows a person with moral capabilities. The duša, furthermore, is viewed as a kind of internal spiritual theatre -a place where events happen which are in principle unknowable to outsiders. But though as the proverb says, čužaja duša pote‹mki 'another person's duša is unfathomable', in Russian culture readiness to open and to "pour out" one's duša is seen as important and good. Cognitive functions are not altogether excluded: one can know or say things v duše 'in one's heart' so long as these things are linked with values and feelings. Also included in the domain of the duša is the human will, as can be seen in the expression duševnaja sila 'spiritual strength, strength of character'. These and other considerations suggest a semantic structure as in (20) A complex ethnopsychological concept like mind or duša embodies an "ethnotheory of the person". Both ethnotheories are basically dualistic, but whereas the Russian lexicon opposes the body to a psychological entity which is unpredictable, emotional, spiritual, expressive and moral, in English the basic dualism is focused on intellectual and rational aspects.
It is useful to view a third explication, this time from Malay (Goddard 2001b) . Unlike mind and duša, the word hati retains a link with a body part (in this case, the liver). According to (21), the hati concept is very "feeling-oriented", but focused primarily on interpersonal feelings. As with Russian duša, the hati is viewed as an inner domain of experience, but there is a heightened emphasis on its motivational consequences, along with a certain moral ambivalence. On account of the hati, a person may have an urge to do bad things as much as good things (hence one ought not unthinkingly or impulsively follow one's hati; as the saying goes, ikut hati mati 'follow the hati, die'). From a phenomenological point of view, hati also differs from the English and Russian concepts in having a quasi-autonomous "expressive" aspect. In numerous Malay collocations the hati speaks, whispers, asks, grumbles, etc. and otherwise prompts the experiencer. As with the Russian concept of duša, the hati is regarded as private and inaccessible, but, unlike as in Russian, there is no priority placed on expressing or communicating the isi hati 'contents of the hati' to other people.
(21) hati (Malay) = a part of a person people think it is like a part of a person's body (a big part inside the middle of the body) when a person thinks about someone else for some time, something can happen in this part when this happens, this person feels something because of it sometimes something good, sometimes something bad because of this, this person wants to do something sometimes something good, sometimes something bad when something happens in this part of a person, sometimes this person can think like this about it: something inside me is saying something to me other people can't know what happens in this part of a person, if this person doesn't want them to know Culture-specific ethnotheories have implications for the phraseology of a language, because they may motivate figurative (or quasi-figurative) expressions involving THINK. To get this in perspective, it is helpful to draw a comparison with the language of emotion (feelings linked with thoughts), which, as previously mentioned, has been studied more intensively than the language of thinking per se. I have in mind Wierzbicka's (1999: 294-302) proposals, subsequently tested by Amberber (2001) and Ye (2002) , that one can distinguish three modes of body-related reference to emotions: (i) reference to external bodily symptoms ('people can see ...' ), e.g. trembling, sweating, (ii) sensation expressions ('this person feels...') e.g. burning, chill, (iii) 'internal bodily images', e.g. heart-broken. In relation to THINKING, it seems that expressions of type (iii) are much more common cross-linguistically than the others, and that by definition these involve "PSI-words", since they involve bodily images rather than literal descriptions. In some languages, phrasemes or secondary lexemes involving ethnopsychological constructs are extremely numerous, far outnumbering primary lexemes in the same domain. In Southeast Asia this is an areal feature (Matisoff 1986 ). Thai and Malay, for example, which are genetically unrelated languages, each have scores of expressions based around Thai cay 'heart, mind, disposition' and Malay hati, respectively (Diller and Juntanamalaga 1990, Goddard 2001b ).
Morphosyntactic elaboration of the cognitive domain
It seems abundantly clear that languages may differ in the extent to which semantic components involving THINK are encoded by morphosyntactic means, and in the type of morphosyntactic categories involved. The following examples are intended to be suggestive of the range of variation, but are not exhaustive. Morphosyntactic encoding is the fourth dimension of cross-linguistic variation.
Constructions indicating spontaneous, or uncontrolled thinking
Constructions indicating that a thought is spontaneous or uncontrolled appear in a variety of unrelated languages. English has impersonal constructions such as 'it crossed my mind that ...', 'it strikes me that ...', 'it occurred to me that ...'. Russian has a veritable plethora of impersonal and dative-subject constructions of depicting spontaneous mental activity (Wierzbicka 1992a: 398-408) . The following examples are from Malay, where prefix ter-can, among other functions, indicate momentaneous thought (Goddard 2001c) . Kami belum terfikir tentang perkara itu. we not.yet TER:think about issue that 'We haven't yet thought about that issue (i.e. getting married).' ("we haven't given it a moment's thought").
"Experiencer" constructions with mental verbs
In many languages, there are experiencer constructions which allow different perspectives on mental events, especially, it seems, those involving amalgams of thinking, feeling and wanting. For example, Polish has an "active experiencer" construction with reflexive particle sie4 (cf. Wierzbicka 1988) . This depicts a feeling state as due to sustained thinking. As another example, Ewe has several experiencer constructions. In one of these, the "stimulus" appears as grammatical subject with the experiencer as object of preposition ná 'to' (Ameka 1990 ). The meaning is that a feeling was induced by a thought, but not because the experiencer wanted it.
(25) a. X felt something because X thought something about S ("stimulus") not because X wanted to feel this
to 1SG 'It pleased me.'
THINK encoded into other morphosyntactic categories
Semantic components involving THINK may sometimes be encoded in the suite of overlapping and ill-defined categories which include evidentiality (cf. Chafe and Nichols 1986, Aikhenvald 2002) , epistemic modality (cf. Palmer 1986 , Nuyts 2001 , and less standard categories such as: mirative, mediative, indirective, presumptive, and speculative (DeLancey 1997, Lazard 1999, Johanson and Utas 2000) .
Evidentiality is normally characterised as a set of categories which indicate the speaker's "source of information" or "the nature of the evidence" for the speaker's belief. Many evidential categories do not involve THINK, such as visual, auditory, and "hearsay" categories (based on SEE, HEAR, and SAY, respectively), and many so-called "inferential" evidentials seem to be concerned with indicating that new knowledge is based on other or prior knowledge, e.g. 'I know this now because I know something else'. But when an evidential category is said to indicate "conjecture", "speculation", or the like, one may well conclude that the component I THINK is involved. For example, Adelaar (1977 , quoted Weber 1986 describes Tarma Quechua -chi as indicating "conjecture", Barnes (1984:264-5) translates Tuyuca -hiỹi as "assumed" ("it is reasonable to assume"), Levinsohn (1975 :14-15, quoted in Palmer 1986 :52) describes the Inga particles cha and sica, as "deduced by the speaker as having probably occurred" and "speculated as possible by the speaker", respectively. In some cases, an analysis which contrasts THINK with KNOW may be appropriate. For example, in her semantic exploration of evidential categories, Wierzbicka (1996: Ch 13) proposes the component 'I think this, I don't say: I know it' for the Tibetan "gnomic" (cf. Woodbury 1986: 190-197) .
Epistemic modality is typically characterised as concerning the "degree of speaker commitment to truth" (Palmer 1986 , Nuyts 2001 , but it is debatable whether such categories necessarily contain any specification about 'truth', in the literal sense. More often what seems to be at issue is rather knowing, and sometimes perhaps, the contrast between KNOW and THINK. For example, the English sentences He must be home because the lights are on and He could be home because the lights are on both display epistemic uses of modal verbs. In both cases, the subordinate clause provides a reason for the speaker's conclusion, but how can one represent the different status of the two conclusions? Perhaps as follows: 'I have to (= can't not) think he is at home' vs. 'I can think he is at home'.
The other categories mentioned above -mirative (sometimes called admirative), mediative, indirective, presumptive, speculative -are less standardised in general descriptive linguistics. DeLancey (1997) proposed mirativity as a natural semantic category based on unexpectedness, surprise, novelty of information, the speaker's unprepared state of mind, etc. He claimed that it was grammaticised in Turkish, among other languages. The notion of mirativity can presumably be resolved into simpler terms involving THINK, e.g. 'I didn't think this would happen'. DeLancey's proposal, however, has been strongly contested by Lazard (1999) and Johanson (2000) who argue that the relevant grammatical category in Turkish (and other Turkic languages) is a much broader one of "indirective" or "mediative", with mirative being merely a context-based interpretation, along with hearsay and inferential interpretations. As far as I can see, the proposed indirective or mediative category is not tied in any particular way to THINKING, as such. On the other hand, some Iranian languages have been reported (Perry 2000) to grammaticise "epistemic nuances" which are labelled as "inferential", "presumptive", or "speculative". Perry likens their meanings to those of the English verbs 'infer', 'presume' and 'guess', and, if valid, this would imply grammaticisation of meanings involving THINK.
Reviewing these contesting interpretations in works by DeLancey, Lazard, Johanson, and Perry (just mentioned), makes one acutely aware of the potential for confusion and misunderstanding which can result from relying on complex, obscure and abstract terminology, e.g. descriptions of indirectivity/meditativity as designating "the presentation of a situation by reference to its reception by a conscious subject" (Johanson 2000: 61) . In my view, the debate would be advanced by an attempt to re-cast or decode the insights behind such descriptions into the clearer and more concrete metalanguage of semantic primes.
Purposive and apprehensional clauses
Among subordinate clause types, it appears that THINK is commonly grammaticised, along with WANT and BECAUSE, in the so-called "purposive clause". As Wierzbicka (2002b: 288-9) points out, a sentence like The man went to the river to bathe implies that the man "is doing something (walking towards the river), so to speak, with an intention in his head: and an 'intention' implies a thought and a want". Roughly:
(26) The man went to the river to bathe = the man went to the river because he thought like this: I want to bathe; when I am at the river, I can do it She speculates that although the "purposive scenario" implied by this line of explication is a semantically complex configuration, it may be very widely, or perhaps even universally, grammaticalised, on account of the importance of goal-directed action in human life. "Apprehensional" clauses or "lest-clauses", in languages which have them, can be regarded as a kind of semantic inverse to purposive clauses; as for example, in a sentence like 'I hid behind the rock, lest the man see me'. See Lichtenberk (1995) for a cross-linguistic review and a detailed treatment of To'aba'ita (Solomon Islands).
It is notable that the combination of THINK with WANT, DO and BECAUSE in purposive clauses is so widespread, in view of the fact that in main clauses the grammatical encoding of THINK tends to be sporadic and "scattered" (Aikhenvald 2002) , rather than forming a broad and coherent grammatical system. This is especially noticeable in comparison with the universal or near-universal grammaticisation of KNOW, WANT and FEEL into sentence typesdeclaratives and questions, imperatives, and exclamatory sentence types, respectively, cf. Wierzbicka (2002b: 281-5) . One can speculate that this phenomenon is linked somehow to the fleeting, inaccessable and subjective nature of thinking, as compared with other basic mental states and processes linked with other comparable primes. ('Knowing' has a long-term public character, i.e. something objective about it. 'Wanting' often translates into action. As for 'feeling', one can often see evidence of feelings in people's faces or gestures; plus, feelings often have motivational and behavioural consequences.) It as if what a person thinks only gains functional importance when it is combined with knowing, wanting, or feeling.
'Cultural scripts' for different 'ways of thinking' (and associated ways of speaking)
One of the oldest insights of contrastive language and culture studies -but at the same time, one of the most controversial -is that different cultures encourage different cognitive styles, i.e. different "ways of thinking" (cf. Whorf 1938 , Hymes 1961 . For example, modern Anglo culture can be characterised as more rationalistic (more "thinking-oriented", more "logical") than many, if not most, other cultures of the world. More specifically, different cultures may endorse particular cognitive strategies for personal interaction, for coping with life's troubles, etc., linked with cultural values. This is a fifth dimension of cross-linguistic, and crosscultural, variation.
Unfortunately, discussions of these topics have always been plagued by methodological difficulties with how to state and, more importantly, how to justify, specific proposals. The recent "crisis of confidence" in anthropology about the validity of the "culture concept" has further complicated the debate. It is virtually impossible to review these issues succinctly and I will not attempt to do so. Instead, I will illustrate how different ways of thinking can be characterised using the "cultural scripts" approach. This is an approach to cultural description which uses lexical and conceptual universals as its medium of cultural notation, with the goal of reducing terminological ethnocentrism and enabling a close integration of cultural and linguistic description (Wierzbicka 1994a (Wierzbicka , 1994b (Wierzbicka , 1999 Ch 7), Goddard and Wierzbicka (1997) , Goddard (1997 Goddard ( , 2000 .
It can be argued, for example, that modern Anglo-American culture encourages a portfolio of interrelated attitudes which can be described in informal terms as "positive thinking", a "can do attitude", and as placing a high value on "self-esteem". In the metalanguage of semantic primes, these notions can be spelt out as in (27).
(27) Some partial Anglo-American cultural scripts for thinking a. it is good if I often think that something good will happen b. it is good if I often think "if I want to do something, I can do it" c. it is good if I can think many good things about me
As another example, traditional Chinese culture endorsed a set of attitudes sometimes referred to as the "Philosophy of the Middle Way", which in part can be spelt out as in (28) (cf. Wierzbicka 2001:49) . This script encourages something like an acceptance of change in life, and an emotional detachment from the events of the moment. Wierzbicka (2002a) makes the point that "from a cross-cultural perspective it is striking to what extent facts tend to be distinguished from opinions in modern English". She traces this cultural ideology back to John Locke and the empiricist tradition, which holds, on the one hand, that opinion grounded in rational thinking is valuable and that everyone has the right to express their opinion, but, on the other hand, insists that opinions should not be held out to be "more" than just that: opinions. They should not be presented as knowledge.
(31) Anglo "I think" vs. "I know" script when I want to say something about something it is good to think like this: if I don't know something I can't say that I know it if I think something about something, I can say that I think like this, I can't say that I know it
Different discourse patterns
Given different cultural scripts, different ethnotheories of the person, different sets of epistemic verbs and qualifiers, different degrees and modes of grammaticalisation, etc., it is not surprising that in normal discourse the range of use of the basic THINK verb differs greatly from language to language. Variation in discourse patterning constitutes the sixth and final dimension of variation to be considered in this study.
As with many areas of typological semantics, contrastive study of this area has scarcely begun, so to give flesh to this observation we probably cannot do better than to look closely at the English language. Certainly it is a striking fact that the verb think, and in particular the collocation I think, has a very high frequency in English, even compared with other European languages, let alone with many indigenous languages from around the world (cf. Wierzbicka 1998) . For example, according to figures in Aijmer (1997) , the expression I think appears in the London-Lund Corpus of English (of about half a million words) at at rate of about 35 occurrences per 10,000 words. In the comparable database of spoken Swedish the figure for the closest Swedish counterpart jag tror (or tror jag) 'I believe' is 2.6 occurrences per 10,000 words (Wierzbicka 2002a) . In a Dutch database (Simon-Vandeberger 1998: 311), the figure for ik denk is 9 per 10,000 words.
A number of scholars (e.g. Aijmer 1997 , Kärrkäinen 1998 , Scheibman 2001 have observed that English I think serves a range of conventionalised conversational and illocutionary functions, e.g. to make suggestions or to mitigate disagreement, not found in many other languages. Perhaps this is not surprising in view of the cultural scripts proposed in the previous section.
It has also been observed that English think occurs in two different constructions, depending on whether or not a complementiser is present. On a range of evidence, Thompson and Mulac (1991) argue that when the "complement" lacks the introductory that, it is often not a true or full complement from a semantic or syntactic point of view. Rather, I think is functioning roughly as an epistemic adverb with respect to a single clause, indicating something like tentativeness. Interestingly, the 'I think ø' construction is overwhelmingly more frequent (accounting for 93% of their conversational data) than 'I think that'. Can one then identify a semantic difference between the two constructions? Aijmer (1997: 21) describes the tentative 'I think ø' in terms of a "softening" effect: "the tentative I think expresses uncertainty (epistemic modality) or softens an assertion which may be too blunt (interactive meaning)". Wierzbicka (2002a) suggests that both these functions have their basis in a semantic component which she formulates as follows: 'I say I think this, I don't say more'.
In a plain declarative sentence, this component interacts with -or rather, cancels out -the core illocutionary component of a declarative sentence, namely, 'I know this'. Thus, on Wierzbicka's analysis, a declarative prefaced by the "epistemic qualifier" I think has the kind of semantic structure shown in (32a), in contradistinction to a plain declarative as in (32b). That is, the speaker is in a sense disclaiming knowledge -not by saying "I don't know" but by saying "I don't say: I know".
(32) a. I think Bill wrote it = I say: I think that Bill wrote it I don't say more I don't say: I know this b. Bill wrote it = I say: Bill wrote it I know this
The effect is different in modally qualified or exclamatory (emotive) sentences, such as I think we should go or I think this is awful. Here the component 'I say I think this, I don't say more' implies that what I say is my personal opinion which doesn't have to be shared by others. The effect is "interactive", in Aijmer's terms. For example:
(33) I think we should go = I say: I think that we should go I say I think this, I don't say more Wierzbicka (2002a) does not hesitate to propose that the function and high frequency of I think are linked with the cultural importance in the modern Anglo world with distinguishing between what 'I think' and what 'I know'. The basic point is that culturally-based routinisation creates distinctive patterns of usage.
Concluding remarks
This study began with the proposition that THINK is a universal semantic prime, and it therefore provides a stable reference point for cross-linguistic comparison (along with other distinct but related semantic primes such as KNOW, WANT, FEEL and SAY). Casting the discussion in terms of THINK allows an orderly and explanatory treatment free from the obscurity and terminological ethnocentrism of complex terms such as 'cognitive activity', 'mental state', 'prehension', etc.
Despite its theoretical and methodological importance, however, the shared presence of the semantic prime THINK seems a very small thing when seen against the backdrop of crosslinguistic variability which has been surveyed in the main body of the paper. Starting with the lexeme for 'think' itself, then moving outward in ever-expanding circles, so to speak, six different dimensions of variability have been canvassed: different patterns of lexical polysemy, different degrees and modes of lexical elaboration (epistemic verbs, words for attitudes, emotions and moods, epistemic particles, qualifiers and interjections), different ethnotheories of the person (which accord differing roles to thinking in relation to other mental processes and states), different ways in which think-related meanings can be encoded morphosyntactically, different cultural scripts which may encourage or discourage particular ways of thinking, and as a consequence of all this, differing patterns of usage in discourse.
One important aspect which has not been explored at any length in the present study, but is nonetheless implicit from the examples provided, is that there is usually considerable language-internal coherence in the way in which THINK manifests itself across lexicon, grammar, and discourse. In any particular language, that is, one might expect to find recurring patterns or themes, comparable to Whorf's (1956) notion of "fashions of speaking". This raises the possibility that a more comprehensive and detailed analysis across a variety of diverse languages would enable one to develop a typology of "cognitive styles" or "ways of thinking".
